Judicial Dissent Under Autocracy: Evidence from the Russian Constitutional Court - Yulia Khalikova

CREECA Lecture Series Podcast

Контент предоставлен CREECA at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Center for Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia at the University of Wisconsin. Весь контент подкастов, включая выпуски, графику и описания подкастов, загружается и предоставляется непосредственно CREECA at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Center for Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia at the University of Wisconsin или его партнером по платформе подкастов. Если вы считаете, что кто-то использует вашу работу, защищенную авторским правом, без вашего разрешения, вы можете выполнить процедуру, описанную здесь https://ru.player.fm/legal.

2y ago 31:04

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Dissenting opinions are an unusual type of judicial behavior, especially in autocracies. Except for in very rare circumstances, separate opinions do not lead to changes in law or policy, but judges spend their time and resources to author them. In authoritarian regimes, dissents are even less expected: why would judges publicly voice their disagreement with the majority given the higher personal risks of expressing such discontent? Using original data on 629 judgments and 8,857 judicial votes, Yulia Khalikova explains dissenting behavior at the RCC.

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