Degrees of Injustice - Encyclopedia #497-499

Robbert Veen's Hegel Podcast

Analysis of three paragraphs in section c. Right vs. Wrong, in Hegel's Encyclopedia.

¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right, still presumed identical with the several titles, is affirmed, willed, and recognized, the only diversity lies in this, that the special thing is subsumed under the one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. This is naive, non−malicious wrong. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement, expressing the civil suit. To settle it there is required a third judgement, which, as the judgement of the intrinsically right, is disinterested, and a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance.

¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrinsically by the particular will, which thus becomes wicked, then the external recognition of right is separated from the right's true value; and while the former only is respected, the latter is violated. This gives the wrong of fraud − the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) − where the nominal relation is retained, but the sterling value is let slip.

¤ 499 (3) Finally, the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. (Here there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the class as a whole, and not merely the particular mode − in this case the apparent recognition.) Thus the will is violently wicked, and commits a crime